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a b s t r a c t 
Heeding recent calls for more studies on the relationship between projects and institutions, this paper reports on a 
collaborative case study to shed light on the recursive relations of large-scale projects and their institutional fields. 
Given the industry as the field-level institution, this study explores how two project organizations experienced 
the industry changes, its influence on the arrangement of large-scale projects, and the management response 
used to legitimize these arrangements. The qualitative secondary data analysis of two High-Speed rail projects 
in Spain and The Netherlands is based on semi-structured interviews, observations, and document analysis. This 
paper provides the institutional fields’ contextual detail and deepens our understanding of temporal institutional 
complexity that bound large-scale project arrangements. The findings suggest that in both cases the management 
responses altered across time and evolved depending on the salience of the institutional pressure, through the 
















































An organizing form defined as megaproject, global project,
r service-led project gained renowned influence in recent years
 Scott, et al., 2011 ; Gemünden, 2015 ; Söderlund, et al., 2018 ).
hese labels apply to large-scale projects that typically involve multi-
rganizations and deliver a substantial physical infrastructure or a com-
lex product with a lifecycle that can extend for decades and across in-
ustries ( Sanderson, 2012 ; Scott & Levitt, 2017 ; Hetemi, et al., 2020 b).
arge-scale projects are complex endeavors embedded in highly institu-
ionalized social structures, involving public and private actors with var-
ous rationalities, modes of collaboration, and project management com-
etencies ( Brunet, 2019; Hetemi, Gemünden, & Ordieres-Meré, 2020a;
an Marrewijk, 2016 ). While large-scale projects are an essential vehi-
le for developing sustainability-oriented infrastructure that helps over-
ome many of today’s societal concerns, their performance in terms of
udget and time remains poor ( Flyvbjerg, 2014 ; Flyvbjerg et al., 2018 ).
lyvbjerg and colleagues have been central in explaining the irrational-
ty in the planning of large-scale projects and pointing to the importance
f cost/benefit analysis for improved performance ( Flyvbjerg et al.,∗ Correspondence author at: Department of Industrial Economics and Management,
weden. 
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263-7863/© 2020 Elsevier Ltd, APM and IPMA. All rights reserved. 018 ). These insights, however, highlight instrumental factors and con-
ider technical elements that decontextualize the projects from their
nvironment (cf. Ainamo et al., 2010 ; Hetemi, Gemünden & Ordieres-
eré, 2020 a), and provide limited explanatory power concerning re-
urrent problems with large-scale projects ( van Marrewijk et al., 2008 ).
he new generation of large-scale projects compels efforts that require
anagement to minimize effects on the surrounding environment and
eek legitimacy for the project ( Uriarte, 2019; van den Ende & van Mar-
ewijk, 2019 ). 
Increasingly it is recognized that large-scale project arrangements
nd their organizing largely depend on the characteristics of the institu-
ional field in which they operate ( Scott, 2012 ; Biesenthal et al., 2018 ;
ieftink, Smits & Lauche, 2019 ; Winch and Maytorena-Sanchez, 2020 ).
t is the set of decisions, goal-formulation, financing, and levels of actor
articipation in these projects, which we call the project arrangement.
iMaggio and Powell (1983 , p. 148) define the institutional field as “rec-
gnized areas of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product
onsumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce
imilar services or products. ” Given this definition, “industries ” are often
een as institutional fields (e.g., Zietsma, Groenewegen & Logue, 2017 ;
ieftink et al., 2019 ). Large-scale projects extend across the institutional KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Lindstedtsvägen 30, SE-100 44 Stockholm, 
.nl (A. van Marrewijk), anna.jerbrant@indek.kth.se (A. Jerbrant), m.g.c.bosch- 
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t  elds ( Scott, 2012 ; Dille, Söderlund and Clegg, 2018 ; Lieftink et al.,
019 ). Hence, the development of these projects is related to numer-
us salient institutional elements such as the regulatory environment
 Miller & Lessard, 2000 ; Chi & Javernick-Will, 2011 ), social footprint
i.e., the size, composition and the populations affected) ( Di Maddaloni
 Davis, 2017 ), environmental complexity ( Bosch-Rekveldt et al., 2011 ),
tc. Yet, the relatively temporary nature and structural hybridity of
arge-scale project arrangements allows a response to shifting situational
hallenges ( Raynard, 2016 ). The challenge, however, lies in finding a
ynamic balance in response to the temporal institutional field shifts
cf. Pemsel & Söderlund, 2020 ). 
So far, extant research has, for the most part, not dealt with the dy-
amics of institutional field shifts and their influences on large-scale
rojects. We agree with other scholars (e.g., Biesenthal et al., 2018 ;
öderlund & Sydow, 2019 ), that project studies may have described
what ” institutional forces impact large-scale projects. Yet we know very
ittle of “how ” these forces influence the arrangement of projects and
heir organizing over time. Hence, we align ourselves with scholars who
xplore the institutional processes – the relation between institutional
elds and large-scale projects (e.g., Dille, et al., 2018 ; Lieftink et al.,
019 ; Matinheikki, Aaltonen & Walker, 2019 ). Accordingly, our study
ims to understand how institutional field(s) influence the arrangements
f large-scale projects and how managers legitimize the arrangements.
t the most general level, legitimacy refers to the degree of alignment
mong the project organization’s structures, procedures, and the orders
nd assumptions of its institutional field ( Scott, 2012 ). We specifically
ocus on how the institutional field shift over time – the existing indus-
rial restructuration – influences the large-scale project arrangements. 
To fully grasp how shifting institutional fields influence project ar-
angements, we draw from the recent stream in institutional theory,
mphasizing institutional complexity and legitimacy ( Greenwood et al.,
011 ; Raynard, 2016 ). We explore how industry-wide reformations pro-
uce temporal pressures for project adaptation. In this view, project or-
anizations do not simply extract legitimacy from the field-level institu-
ions, but rather struggle to find legitimacy, in a playing field in which
nstitutional logics and project arrangements including governing prac-
ices co-exist and evolve throughout the project lifecycle. 
The institutional approach enables us to deconstruct the temporal dy-
amic and multifaceted relationship between the institutional field and
he project organization ( Söderlund & Sydow, 2019 ). It gives an insight
nto the inter-institutional nature of large-scale projects ( Dille & Söder-
und, 2011 ), characterized by multiple “authorities ” and conflicting
stakeholders ” proffering alternative bases of legitimation ( Scott et. al.,
011 , p. 60). Methodologically, we build on a collaborative case study
 George et al., 2005 ), and use secondary analysis of qualitative data from
wo in-depth case studies. Two High-Speed rail Line (HSL) projects were
tudied: HSL Madrid-Barcelona (1990-2017, Spain), and HSL South
1998-2009, Netherlands). Data gathered in 1995-2018 was analyzed,
ncluding a subset of the primary studies’ data, observations, official re-
orts and internal documents, 17 interviews on the Spanish case, and
9 interviews on the Dutch case. 
This research is aligned with the growing interests of project schol-
rs in institutional theory ( Bresnen, 2016 ; Söderlund & Sydow, 2019 )
nd makes a two-fold contribution to the debate on large-scale project
rganizing. The first contribution is that we provide a detailed ac-
ount of the effects of field restructuration to large-scale infrastructure
rojects as inter-organizational setting as asked for by others (cf. Sydow
 Braun, 2018 ). We found that project actor responses were not single
nd sustainable responses, nor framed the whole time strategically as
requently highlighted (e.g., Derakhshan, et al., 2019 ; Nguyen et al.,
019 ), but primarily temporal responses focused on gaining social le-
itimacy. In light of the emerging industry principles, new industry
rocedures, and substantive agendas, diverse legitimacy approaches co-
ccurred and alternated (i.e., normative, technical, etc.), thus, creating
hat we label as cycles of project legitimacy process. Secondly, we de-
elop a dynamic and nuanced insight concerning the recursive influence296 f institutional fields on project life through the role of regulative, nor-
ative, and cultural-cognitive forces that the reformation of collabora-
ion management (re)created through the course of large-scale projects.
ur analyses established different types of legitimation approaches as
nfolding events in which project actors engaged in a rather temporal
esponsive manner. We found three legitimation acquisition approaches
hat the management of the two studied HSL projects employed in
oping with the pressure from the institutional fields throughout the
rojects’ lifecycle. Our findings affirm that the arrangements made by
roject actors (organizations and individuals alike) are possibly partial
nd heavily influenced by changes in the industry structure. 
After this introduction, the paper is structured as follows. First, the
nstitutional theory and legitimacy concept is critically reviewed, fol-
owed by the research design and methods used in this paper. Third, the
ndings are shared addressing the institutional field, and its influence in
he HSL projects’ arrangement, the responses that their management em-
loys for coping with it, the acquisition approaches to gain legitimacy.
inally, the discussion and conclusion sections provide the analysis, im-
lications, paper limitations, and future research suggestions. 
. Institutional theory and legitimacy 
The institutional theory is known for its capacity to contextualize or-
anizational phenomena ( Scott, 1987 ). It has a sociological flavor, ques-
ioning whether individual choices and preferences can be adequately
nderstood despite historical and cultural frameworks in which they are
mbedded ( DiMaggio & Powell, 1983 ). In our research context, this im-
lies that the institutional field – the industry – penetrates the large-scale
projects) temporary organizing and creates the lenses through which
roject actors view the world. 
.1. Institutional complexity and legitimacy (what, where and how) 
An influential line that runs institutional theory is the institutional
ogics perspective, which stands against the individualist rationalism
erspective and brings society back into the meaningful practice of or-
anizational spheres ( Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsury, 2012 , 2015 ; see
lso Friedland and Alford, 1991). Defined as the “socially constructed,
istorical patterns of cultural symbols and material practices ” that sig-
ify patterns that constitute proper behavior and establish the criteria
or legitimacy ( Thornton et al., 2012 , p. 2), institutional logics bridges
ocietal institutions that yield stability and meaning with the legitimate
ctions of the individual (project or organization). Typically, (project)
rganizations cope with multiple logics, underpinning different and of-
en contradictory norms, understandings, and identities, thus experienc-
ng institutional complexity ( Greenwood et al., 2011 ). The underlying
rgument is that (project) organizations’ ability to engage or respond
o multiple logics that manifest at the institutional field delivers legiti-
acy but also has implications for their performance in solving today’s
omplex societal concerns ( Greenwood et al., 2011 ; Raynard, 2016 ). 
Legitimacy is the cornerstone of the institutional theory, understood
s the social acceptability and credibility that the project organization
equires to survive and thrive in their environment ( Pedersen & Dob-
in, 2006 ; Scott, 2012 ). In project studies the concept of legitimacy and
nstitutional theory at large is nascent ( Bresnen, 2016 ; Biesenthal et al.,
018 ; Söderlund & Sydow, 2019 ). Previous research has considered dif-
erent management actions to be critical in achieving project legitimacy.
ome studies have focused on decision process strategies and factors
onsidering legitimacy-as-property (e.g., Aaltonen, 2013 ; Nguyen et al.,
019 ), a fixed resource that is measurable and operationally manage-
ble. Little is known about the process of legitimacy building, how man-
gers legitimize these arrangements and how the project processes and
ctivities are affected by their institutional field (cf. van den Ende & van
arrewijk, 2019 ). 
We therefore turn our attention to organization studies where
he concept of legitimacy has received significant attention and has


































































































































r  een the subject of extensive research ( Deephouse & Suchman, 2008 ;
uddaby, Bitektine & Haack, 2017 ). Organizational scholars have fo-
used their efforts on investigating the essential properties of legitimacy
nd have categorized it into different typologies. Suchman’s, influential
ypology identifies three broad types of legitimacy: pragmatic, moral,
nd cognitive (see Suchman, 1995 ). 
Organization studies literature is particularly helpful for understand-
ng the what, where, and how of legitimacy. Yet, a profound reflec-
ion on the social nature of legitimacy is needed as the concept is built
n both the strategic ( Oliver, 1991 ) and institutional traditions (e.g.,
eyer & Rowan 1977 ; DiMaggio & Powell 1983 ). To our knowledge,
urrent project studies seem to ignore such consequences. In response
o the question of what legitimacy is, we incline towards the process
erspective. Thus, legitimacy is understood here as not being a sta-
le condition, but rather “as being actively and continually negotiated ”
 Suddaby et al., 2017 , p. 24). It is an ongoing process showing that
he actions are appropriate within the socially constructed system of
orms and values, which must repeatedly be “created, recreated and
onquered ” (ibid. p. 25). Contrary to the prior understanding in project
tudies (e.g., Aaltonen, 2013 ), legitimacy is not monolithic and can vary
ver time. Indeed the same project practices, actions, and judgments can
ecome legitimate or not over time. 
Turning to the second implied question, where does it occur?
hen legitimacy is seen as a process, a multi-level analysis is re-
uired including the institutional project field and the project ac-
ors’ inter-relations ( Scott, 2012 ). To date, legitimacy in project stud-
es has adopted cross-sectional case studies to identify stable strate-
ies (e.g., Aaltonen, 2013 ; Nguyen et al., 2019 ) and elements of legiti-
acy (e.g., Derakhshan et al. 2019 ). Taking an institutional approach,
cott (2012) commends that each project, independently of its scale and
cope, will be confronted by its institutional field. The field will include
1) relevant governmental organizations (local or national levels includ-
ng tax agencies and offices reinforcing labor and environmental stan-
ards); (2) individual and organizational residents residing in and shar-
ng the project environment (the groups that have already established
ormative and cultural-cognitive frameworks); (3) those currently em-
loyed in the affected sector (e.g., union organizations); (4) social move-
ent organizations (e.g., professional associations, concerned with nor-
ative arguments); and (5) potential beneficiaries (those whose inter-
sts are served in the event that the project development takes place). 
To address the third and last question: how does legitimacy oc-
ur?, we need to account for the institutional approach in the project,
ntailing a close understanding of the inter-organizational facets over
 period. Through the institutional prism ( Scott, 2013 ), legitimacy is
nderstood via the process of how the project organization creates
nd maintains “alignment ” between the internal structural/ perfor-
ance characteristics and external field pressures in building legiti-
acy. Suddaby et al (2017) , addressing the concept of legitimacy, ob-
erved three distinct organizational approaches to gaining legitimacy
a “fit ” with the environmental pressures: (1) isomorphism or adap-
ion to fit underlying cultural-cognitive legitimacy basis, (2) decoupling
r adaptation within two environments or signaling normative legiti-
acy and (3) performing or demonstrating technical legitimacy. The
echanisms to ensure legitimacy equal roughly Scott’s (2013) outlining
f three kinds of ‘institutional pillars’: technical/regulative, normative,
nd cultural-cognitive, which serves our framing. 
.2. Project response mechanisms to institutional complexity and pressures 
Large-scale projects’ temporariness and the conditions of institu-
ional complexity can have major implications for the project man-
gement and legitimacy ( Dille & Söderlund, 2011 ; Greenwood et al.,
011 ; Scott, 2012 ; Dille et al., 2018 ). Institutional complexity resem-
les the multivocal understandings that project actors pose in the man-
gement of large-scale projects ( Biesenthal et al., 2018 ; Gottlieb et al.,
020 ; Winch & Maytorena-Sanchez, 2020 ). The “temporariness ” of297 arge-scale projects poses significant management challenges ( Grabher
 Thiel, 2015 , p. 330). Precisely their temporariness and the nature
f institutional complexity concerning large-scale projects imply the
eed for explicitly connecting them as projects in multiple contexts
 Manning, 2008 ). In the broader picture, large-scale project arrange-
ent and their organizing are not subject to the intra-organizational
onstraints only or their technical environment. There are also joint
onstraints and enablers from the institutional field, such as the inter-
rganizational network ( Sydow & Braun, 2018 ) or the sector and indus-
ry ( Manning, 2008 ; Scott, 2012 ). Projects are embedded in other per-
anent institutional, but still changing, environments ( Manning, 2008 ;
inch & Maytorena-Sanchez, 2020 ). 
Hitherto, scholars have recognized the importance of large-scale
rojects in acquiring knowledge of local institutions ( Grabher &
hiel, 2015 ), and the necessity for aligning the project with the insti-
utional field ( Engwall, 2003 ; Chi & Javernick-Will, 2011 ). However,
roject studies are ambiguous when discussing the institutional field of
he project ( Scott et al., 2011 ; Scott, 2012 ). Some associate it with the
ormal and regulatory bodies – treating institutions as environments ex-
ernal to the project (e.g., Miller & Lessard 2000 ). Others treat it as a
eld that needs attention but can be managed by the project manager
e.g., Morris & Geraldi, 2011 ; Aaltonen, 2013 ). We agree with Söderlund
 Sydow (2019) that project studies would benefit from adding the in-
titutional ingredients of meaning, concept categories, and models for
rganizing, per institutional theory. In this regard, it is no longer pos-
ible to think of the institutional fields as being out there ( Granqvist &
ustafsson, 2016 ; Tukiainen & Granqvist, 2016 ). Instead, their elements
re part of the project organization, infusing it with value and connect-
ng it with long-term structures. These considerations underscore the
pportunity to address institutional field complexity through institu-
ional project response mechanisms, temporary organizing, and hybrids
 Granqvist & Gustafsson, 2016 ; Raynard, 2016 ). Furthermore, these in-
ights suggest that projects as “temporary organizations ” with “institu-
ional termination ” provide an immense potential for temporal analysis
f the recursive interaction between inter-organizational projects and
heir institutional fields; on how large-scale projects as relatively tempo-
ary endeavors rely upon, cope with and reshape longer-term structures
cf. Grabher & Thiel, 2015 ). 
How the institutional field influences large-scale projects and how
rojects respond to institutional complexity and pressure has recently
ttracted academic attention ( Hall & Scott, 2019 ; Matinheikki et al.,
019 ; Qiu et al., 2019 ; Gottlieb et al., 2020 ). Not surprisingly an emer-
ent and growing stream of research has started to examine the use of
hybrid ” and relatively temporary arrangements for coping with volatile
omplexity (cf. Raynard, 2016 ). For instance, Gottlieb et al. (2020) see
he dynamic shaping of project partnerships, influenced by changing and
omingling institutional logics. They distinguish diverse coping mech-
nisms to institutional demands through: (1) articulating new logics,
2) disassociating existing practices, (3) redefining roles, and (4) creat-
ng rules to facilitate collaboration. Matinheikki et al. (2019) show how
ublic commissioners of a tunnel construction project adopted project
lliancing principles to construct a hybrid organization to respond to in-
titutional complexity, combining the rationales of different logics into
heir modus operandi. To respond to external demands, they used three
echanisms: (1) publicizing a new hybrid form of organizing, (2) re-
eiving social acceptance from project stakeholders, and (3) selective
oupling of external demands. To mitigate internal tensions, they used
hree other mechanisms: (1) jointly forming structures to align goals
nd unify actions, (2) ensuring adaptive capacity, and (3) blending di-
erse professional groups. Qiu et al. (2019) contemplate four coping
echanisms of institutional complexity in their study of the Hong Kong-
huhai-Macao Bridge. Two mechanisms were found for alleviating the
mpact of conflicting institutional demands on the performance: (1) the
stablishment of a system leader to coordinate with the governments,
nd (2) the localization of practices to reduce the conflicts between the
egulations and standards of the three involved regions. Furthermore,



























































































































i  hey found two mechanisms for reducing the micro-level impact of con-
icting institutional demands through: (1) the creation of the structure
f a hierarchal function for tasks and organization, and (2) the flexi-
le design of the project organization. A distinction can thus be made
etween the macro and micro institutional complexity of responses. Be-
ides this, response mechanisms of projects to cope with institutional
omplexity and pressure can also shift over time. 
Van den Ende and van Marrewijk (2019) found that in a metro tunnel
egaproject the strategies for coping with institutional pressure shifted;
rom oppressive use of military police to repositioning the project as en-
ironmentally sensitive, inclusive and open; from hiding from public
ebate to engaging in public debate and making the project more vis-
ble and accessible; and from declaring future metro lines taboo to en-
aging and communicating with society over new metro lines. Further-
ore, the response mechanism can influence institutional complexity.
all and Scott (2019) for example, report on a temporary project-based
rganization that significantly transformed the institutional frameworks
nd associated rules, norms, and belief systems surrounding construc-
ion project organizations –in much the same way as (a lineage of) in-
ovative exploratory projects can transform the institutional framework
f the construction sector and thus create an opening for sustainable in-
ovations ( Koch-Ørvad et al., 2019 ). A mechanism for responding to in-
titutional pressure is thus a multi-level phenomenon, which can change
ver time and can transform institutional frameworks. 
. Research design and methods 
We build on a collaborative case study design to understand the
ecursive relations between large-scale projects and their institutional
elds. A collaborative case study design is a case comparison method,
ncluding cases, built by different scholars ( George et al., 2005 ). Accord-
ng to George et al., scholars are “increasingly working collaboratively
cross cases to advance shared substantive research programs ” (ibid.
5). However, a structured and focused case comparison is difficult to
arry out, when different scholars have undertaken each case study,
s reported here. Specific methodological considerations are needed
hen using existing data to generate new knowledge ( Heaton, 2008 ;
ndrews et al., 2012 ; Dufour & Richard, 2019 ). We return to them in
ection 3.4. 
.1. Case selection 
The railway sector in Europe has undergone considerable
de)centralization variation over time as a sector ( Geyer &
avies, 2000 ). We selected the two cases – the HSL Madrid-Barcelona
nd HSL South – through theoretical sampling because we consider
hem to be suitable and revelatory in the light of institutional constructs
 Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007 ). Firstly, the cases were comparable
s they were conducted within the same industry. Although the
nstitutional reform of the rail sector took place in different years,
995 in the Netherlands and 2002 in Spain, both cases share related
nstitutional elements within the European rail industry, i.e., sharing
imilar industry structures such as the ERTMS safety systems, among
thers. We consider a complex of diverse organizations sharing the
ame or related institutional habits as the focus of analysis. In this
ontext, we treat specific processes and project activities in detail, but
t is “the nesting of these processes into the whole that gives them
eaning ” ( Scott, 1987 , p. 494). Secondly, both cases provided access
o potentially rich critical data. They were considered both symbolic
n terms of infrastructure investment, and there was considerable
ocumentary evidence of them in newspapers, audits, and official
eports ( Report, 2012 , 2017 ; Omega Team Report, 2014 ). Both of the
ases that we examine here illustrate organizing and practices driven
oth by the industry’s structural changes and the agency in projects. 298 .2. Brief description of primary data collected 
Over more than 15 years, data were collected through semi-
tructured interviews, observations, secondary data sources, audits, and
fficial reports. The primary source of information consisted of 137 in-
erviews with respondents from the Madrid-Barcelona HSL project and
he HSL South. We have collected data from multiple levels and different
ctor viewpoints, including Adif and ProRail management division, ma-
or contractors, and suppliers. Interviews were semi-structured, lasted
pproximately between one and two and a half hours each, and were
igitally recorded and transcribed. In Table 1 , we explain the primary
ata collected for both cases in greater detail. 
.3. Qualitative secondary data analysis 
For the secondary data analysis ( Andrews et al., 2012 ; Dufour &
ichard, 2019 ), which is the focus of this paper, a subset of the data
rom the primary studies included observations, reports, and internal
ocuments, 17 interviews for case I, and 19 interviews for case II. The
rst and second authors were part of the independent research data col-
ection teams, and they analyzed the primary data for the specific cases
ublished in peer-reviewed journals, which helped avoid the main pit-
alls of secondary analysis ( Andrews et al., 2012 ). However, a limitation
s that the first author participated only in the second half of the data
ollection process for the first case – the second period, see Table 1 . The
xtensive case studies and detailed data collection process are reported
n research articles A and B. In this paper, we pooled the data collected
eparately for the two cases. We worked with two other independent
esearchers, the third and fourth authors, in carrying out the secondary
nalysis. In the secondary data analysis, an in-depth investigation of the
mergent aspects of data that were only partially addressed in the prime
tudies is undertaken. Indeed the hindsight approach, which we employ,
s conceived to overcome the essential problem in large-scale project re-
earch of the time-frozen cross-section of a process that unfolds over
any years. The benefits of this approach have also been reported as
he “wisdom of hindsight ” ( Dufour & Richard, 2019 ). Employing this
pproach avails the known outcomes of the HSL cases, and the depth of
he primary data collected over 15 years. 
Since it is difficult to objectively measure the influence of the institu-
ional field on large-scale projects ( Tolbert & Barley, 1997 ; Scott, 2012 ),
e used an interpretative research approach consciously attempting
o discover interviewees’ points of view ( Gioia, Corley & Hamilton,
013 ). Following the guidelines set for qualitative inquiry ( Denzin &
incoln, 2011 ), we used both first and second-order analyses. In the
rst-order analysis, we aimed to understand the peculiarities and the
verall implications of the institutional field – the industrial structure
here the project organizations resided. Given the suggestions of earlier
esearch that links actions and institutions ( Tolbert & Barley, 1997 ), we
onsidered these tasks in the secondary data analysis that analytically
orrespond to the research process. They include: 1) Defining the insti-
utional field as an industry, which in this case had undergone change
ver the term of the implemented HSL projects; 2) Tracing activities
t the HSL project sites and extracting transcripts referring to activities
f particular periods corresponding to the change; 3) Reviewing scripts
or evidence of change in interaction patterns during the same periods;
) Connecting findings from observational data with other sources of
ata on the industry restructuration, e.g., official reports ( Report, 2012 ,
017 ; Omega Team Report, 2014 ). 
Through sampling of the primary data collected, we increased the
ossibility of revealing transcripts to maintain the suspected industry
nfluences while actively scanning for data to disconfirm the presence
f such relations ( Chiasson & Davidson, 2005 ). We employed event
tructure analysis to identify the main cross-case patterns of impor-
ance: the institutional field – the industrial structure, the philosophy,
nd legal boundaries influencing the project processes and its organiz-
ng. From this part of the analysis, four institutional fields or industry-
E. Hetemi, A. van Marrewijk, A. Jerbrant et al. International Journal of Project Management 39 (2021) 295–307 
Table 1 
A summary of primary data collected. 
Data collection method Data collected 





40 interviews with the HSL PM, Adif Quality Controller, Head of Infrastructure Projects, Engineer at Organization B, 
project proponent and other relevant actors. Average duration was slightly over one hour. 
Second period 
(2015-2018) 
12 interviews with the program managers and other relevant actors (project managers, construction manager at 
Adif, Organization A Contractor PM, Organization B Supplier, Organization C Contractor PM). Average duration was 







Extensive informal communication 
Second period 
(2015-2018) 
The insider spent 2-3 days per week at the organization’s offices and conducted observations: 
7 management meetings 
Extensive informal communication 
Field notes for each of the days spent on site 





85 interviews with four public organizations in the field involved: the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment; 
Rijkswaterstaat, which manages road and water infrastructure; ProRail, which manages rail infrastructure; and the 
passenger rail operator Dutch Railways. The HSL PM, Adif Quality Controller, Head of Infrastructure Projects, 




10 interviews with relevant stakeholders in the project (project managers, construction managers, and other large 
contractors and suppliers involved in the project) 
Third period 
(2014-2015) 





Participant observations were carried out for 18 months, for three days a week 
Group interviews 
Desk research 
Extensive informal communication 
second interval 
(2015-2018) 
Extensive informal communication 
Field notes for each of the days spent on site 
Document analysis 
for both case I, and 
II. 
In total more than 30 documents: 
For both cases we reviewed internal program documents (internal financial and audit reports, overview presentations, internal organization 
and escalation matrices, lessons learned, and program tools, e.g., risk logs). 
Organization-wide guidelines and frameworks for project and program risk management related to the HSL Madrid-Barcelona. 
Three parliamentary enquiries related to the HSL South project: the enquiry of the HSL tender process (Survey-Committee-Construction, 
2002), of the decision-making process used (Commission-Duijvensteijn, 2004), and of the tendering for the high-speed trains called Fyra 
(Parliamentary-Commission, 2015). 
























































t  elated themes emerged: 1) the restructuring of the railway sector, 2)
ssignment of the project, 3) tender regulations, and 4) fragmentation
f project organization. 
In the second-order analysis, we aimed to understand how the
anagers legitimize the HSL project arrangements, and the responses
hat their management employs for coping with the institutional influ-
nce. While there were no hypotheses a priori, to ensure comparabil-
ty between the cases, the content analysis of the data was guided by
cott (2013) . The data at this stage were analyzed, studying how our in-
erviewees interpreted the “institutional environment ” and “the project ”
o see how the former influenced their activities, over time and practice.
n this phase of the analysis, we adopted an iterative method of constant
omparison, moving between the data and the institutional theory. Em-
loying the “pattern inducing, ” analysis (Reay and Jones, 2016), we
abulated the project participants’ activities on each project and their
anagement responses for coping with the institutional influences. For
nstance, whether, due to sector reforms in the railway industry, the
roject activities were influenced; or whether safety and engineering
orms changed, and how they affected the project operations, etc. In
racing the management responses through time, we paid particular at-
ention to events within the project level, and in the institutional field
evel —the peripheral events seemingly remote from the project —in cre-
ting a time dependent storyline of events, see Fig. 1 . 
For each case, the most frequent activities related to legitimation
ere grouped and later coded. Again, we followed Tolbert and Barley’s
1997) recommendations and adopted these processes for analyzing
cripts: 1) arranged data by categories and unit of observation, 2) iden-
ified activities within categories, 3) identified commonalities across
ases, and 4) compared transcripts over time. We consider the railway
ndustry to be a relatively highly institutionalized field, an industry with299 xisting practices, power structures, governance mechanisms, and sub-
ect positions, which helped us to distinguish the industry influences
 Zietsma et al., 2017 ). For each institutional field dimension (e.g., indus-
ry organization member interaction, involving new procedures, rules),
 legitimation element was set and coded independently. From the de-
ailed case analyses and their comparison, three legitimation acquisition
pproaches were distinguished. We discuss them extensively in section
. At the end of the secondary data analysis, the augmented data struc-
ure was created, see Table. 2 . We show the representative quotations,
rst themes, and empirical events as supplementary material for space
easons. 
.4. Criteria for judging the trustworthiness of the research design 
We draw on the social science research quality criteria for the re-
earch design ( Denzin & Lincoln, 2011 ). For space reasons, as supple-
entary material we provide the criteria and the steps to address the re-
uirements of both cases in greater detail. We also indicate the key issues
elated to qualitative secondary data analysis ( Heaton, 2008 ; Dufour &
ichard, 2019 ), and we explain the measures we have taken to over-
ome them. 
. The institutional field of the Spanish HSL (Case I) 
High-speed trains started developing in Spain in the 1990s. The
adrid-Barcelona HSL (1990-2017) was ambitiously planned and de-
igned to reach speeds of 350 km/h, connecting Spanish capital Madrid
ith the city of Barcelona. It also connected Spain to the European high-
peed rail network. Adif (owner) developed the project scope based on
hree major construction segments. The first segment relied on ERTMS
E. Hetemi, A. van Marrewijk, A. Jerbrant et al. International Journal of Project Management 39 (2021) 295–307 
Fig. 1. Identified actions to legitimation approaches, comping both HSL project case timelines. 
Table 2 
Data structure, codes, themes and emergent categories. 
Some codes Themes Categories 
Railway industry changes 
Public tendering law 
Changes in project procurement 
Shifts in infrastructure market 
Hierarchical governance and organization 
Diverse teams and expertise 
ERTMS system 
Installation and manufacturing standards 
Project governing and the link to the parent organization 
Project segmentation 
Collaboration or actors’ interaction 
PPP 
Restructuring of the railway sector 
Assignment of the project 
Tender regulations 
Fragmentation of project organization 
The influence of the institutional field 
in the project arrangement 
Managers perform and proactively inform stakeholders 
Managers review industrial regulations periodically 
Managers engage in selective coupling 
Project members adopt best PM practice and other industry guidelines 
Mimicking standards, and inclined to complementary technology adoption 
Endorse project members to participate in external technical discourses 
Set up of IT integration within organization 
Advertising the image of a modern transportation 
























[  .0, while the other two relied on ERTMS 2.0. The project’s network
eam continuously rearranged the project’s design and plans, redefining
ts scope. 
.1. Restructuring of the railway sector 
The HSL project being embedded in the transportation sector has,
ver time, undergone considerable centralization and decentralization.
ntil the early 1990s, most European railway systems were orga-
ized in state-owned and vertically integrated monopolies ( Geyer &
avies, 2000 ; Gruening, 2001 ). Since the mid-1990s, however, the rail-300 ay systems have been restructured and deregulated, breaking the mo-
opolistic positions based on the EU Directive ( Dir.91/440/EEC 1991 ).
uch circumstances led to the emergence of new co-operation patterns
mong the railway supply industry and the operators. Accordingly, in
003, during the Madrid-Barcelona HSL project, the railway sector was
eorganized, laying the foundation for new players to enter the market.
he public agency Adif was created and acted as the infrastructure man-
ger of the Madrid-Barcelona HSL. Adif replaced the already assigned
unctions of both the GIF and the operator – RENFE. At the same time,
 new public body was created, the business entity RENFE-Operadora
the operator]. The European rail industry, the Ministry of Infrastruc-


























































































































m  ure Development, the Government of Catalonia, Madrid and Barcelona
ity councils, the European Investment Bank, Adif, RENFE-Operadora,
arge contractors, and other specialized suppliers were principal actors
orming the structure of the project’s institutional field (Report, 2017 ). 
.2. Assignment of the project 
During the HSL project implementation, Adif procured the work, per-
ormed the supervision, and managed the project of the lines’ construc-
ion. The industry and regulatory regime influenced the management
ctions, as the transportation sector and the rail industry were increas-
ngly based on contractual relationships. In Spain, the formal authoriza-
ion for project initiation was given by the Ministry of Infrastructure
evelopment, which instructed the Sub-directorate of Railway Planning
o prepare an informative study involving the detailed design and plan-
ing as well as the environmental and social impact of the project. With
hat, the ministry issued a formal order to Adif to start the construc-
ion of the line, including the search for the financing of the new HSL
rom European funds, and overall to execute the project. Nevertheless,
his formal order to Adif was given before the informative study was
pproved. As the Ministry of Environment processed the environmental
mpact statement, its progress was beyond the control of the Ministry
f Infrastructure Development. This resulted in major setbacks, such as
odifications that influenced the implementation and management. The
M at Adif described: “There is no time to conduct a feasibility study
r to assess the infrastructure needs accurately. ” (Interview with former
SL PM, December 1997). 
.3. Tender regulations 
The management of the HSL project was divided into three parts,
losely linked to the management of the contracts and the legal regime,
recisely related to the public sector tendering law. Adif is 100% pub-
icly owned, i.e., the Spanish government holds 100% of the shares and
s represented on the board. As indicated earlier, the planning and design
f the HSL project were an “entry ”. This holds until 2003; after that and
ecause of insufficient in-house resources, the Ministry of Infrastructure
evelopment decided to initiate the tendering as a Public-Private Part-
ership (PPP), i.e., combining EU funds with private financing resources
 Fara et al., 2018 ). 
The HSL project involved procurement through multiple contractors
nd suppliers at different points in time and contract packages, e.g.,
racks, signal systems, installations, energy systems. There were two
ain contract types: Design-Bid-Build (DBB), and Design-Build (DB). On
he one hand, within DBB contracts, the contractors were not involved
n the design and specification of the work, but the contractors could
uggest alternative solutions. Adif discussed the solutions with the con-
ractors, and when they were technically equal and economically com-
lementary to the agreement proposed in tendering documents, then
dif’s management advanced that solution. It is worth noting that at the
ime of the project’s implementation, the Spanish contractors and sup-
liers were among the largest worldwide, and they employed in-house
ngineers (Belmonte, 2016; Report, 2017 ). Following the European ten-
ering laws and regulations for the sector, the lion’s share of the contract
ackages in the HSL project, over 75%, were tendered through prequal-
fication. However, the Spanish public administration tended to protect
he local consulting and design engineering firms ( Report, 2013 ). Adif
ocused on competitive tendering and selected the contractors based on
he lowest bid/price. Besides, due to public tendering law, there were
o long-term collaborative arrangements, i.e., procurement was based
n a contract-by-contract relationship. On the other hand, the adoption
f DB for heavy civil infrastructure, such as tunnels and bridges, oc-
urred because Adif expected the contractors or specialist suppliers to
rovide innovative technologies in such a complex endeavor (Internal
ocument; cooperation agreement, 2006). DB involved two contracts
or the 28.7 km Guadarrama tunnel, and two others to connect different301 odes to the existing rail networks (Internal document; financial report,
009). Each contract was given to an independent consortium. 
.4. Fragmentation of project organization 
When a project is as complex as the HSL execution, it is not possible
o define the management model on one level. As seen above, this type
f project is developed through a series of performance units that ad-
ress either a specific specialty in line, or segments of the same. In Adif,
he works were divided between specialist teams (the internal project
takeholders) at the Spanish regional headquarters. They worked with a
ange of suppliers and (sub)contractors. The project involved three main
nternal stakeholders: 1) the construction and engineering team, 2) the
perations and engineering team, and 3) the infrastructure exploitation
eam. Due to the project procurement methods adopted, these specific
eams were not involved in the project, which posed severe challenges
or the project implementation process. For instance, only the engineer-
ng team was involved early in the project and not the other two teams,
hich influenced future interactions. The project workers had to relate
o and make sense of different teams’ opinions and processes, but not
ll were aware of the implications. Not all team members had access or
nough time to relate to the more macro level. The structural changes
n the project affected the implementation process, which also led to
he re-adjustment of the organizational structure over time. The team
embers were focused on getting the work done. But this also yielded
he issue of alignment within the internal teams as raised by a member
f Adif’s management, who highlighted the following: 
“I work closely together with the engineering and design team, and I
rioritize and reprioritize work according to their requests. They are
exible to some extent, but they have a program pattern, and they
eed to deliver accordingly. We could improve the learning process and
ain mutual benefits, which we currently do not have. ” (Transcript of a
esearch-related meeting with Adif’s management, June 2017.) 
. The institutional field of the Dutch HSL (Case II) 
In the 1990s, the High-Speed Line South (HSL South) was a symbol
f European integration (van Marrewijk, 2017). The HSL South connects
msterdam to Brussels and the further Trans European Network of high-
peed lines. The megaproject, which started in 1995, was completed
n 2009 with four years of delay (van Marrewijk, 2017) and ran over
udget; originally contracted for €6.87 billion, it finally costed €9.79
illion ( Omega Team Report, 2010 , 2014). Finally, the high-speed line
ever came into full operation as the delivery of new high-speed trains
as first delayed and later cancelled by Dutch Railways. 
.1. Restructuring of the railway sector 
During the initial period of the HSL South, the 1990s, the Dutch
overnment intended to liberalize the Dutch rail sector. This anti-
onopolistic thinking dominated the European political agenda in the
990s (van Duijnhoven, 2010 ) and the Dutch government was opti-
istic over a European rail market, open to competition. Consequently,
n 1995 Dutch Railways was privatized, with the Dutch government be-
ng the sole shareholder. The relation between the national government
nd Dutch Railways was stable and secure, but tensions over the quality
nd price of rail transport regularly emerged. Therefore, ten years later,
he organization was split into the passenger railway operator Dutch
ailways and the infrastructure owner ProRail. This split would allow
or more competition on the Dutch railway. ProRail became a depart-
ent of the Ministry of I&E and was responsible for the construction
nd maintenance of the rail network (van Duijnhoven, 2010 ). The Min-
stry of I&E initiated rail projects and controlled the budget, while Pro-
ail was responsible for the initiation, decision-making, and operating
hases of the rail projects. However, only recently the Dutch govern-
ent decided, after a number of rail incidents and after dropping the

























































































































c  dea of competition on the rail network, to merge Dutch Railways and
roRail again, 15 years after their separation. Experts in the field of rail
ransport are very critical and think this structural merger does nothing
o help improve their collaboration. 
.2. Assignment of the project 
Back in the 1990s the Ministry of I&E was still positive about the
hilosophy of new public management, which advocated reducing the
esponsibilities of the public sector on the basis that market organiza-
ions could do such tasks more cheaply and better than public-sector or-
anizations ( Gruening, 2001 ). The Ministry of I&E wanted to break the
onopolistic position of Dutch Railways and assigned the Department
f Infrastructure and Water Management, in this paper called DIWM, to
anage the HSL project. This department is normally responsible for the
esign, construction, management, and maintenance of road and water
nfrastructure and had no experience with rail construction. To their as-
onishment, Dutch Railways were sidelined, and it was only after the
roject was finished that the rail track was handed over to them. Con-
equently, only very few project managers came from Dutch Railways,
hile the CEO reported via the secretary-general of the Ministry to the
inister of I&E. 
.3. Tender regulations 
The HSL project is the largest PPP contract ever awarded by the
utch government and one of the most significant high-speed railway
rojects in Europe to date. This PPP contract has a construction period
f five years covering the design, build, and financing of the superstruc-
ure for the HSL line, followed by a twenty-five-year maintenance pe-
iod. Although most of the designing was the result of public-private
ooperation, and the hybrid organizational construction was reflected
n the way the project organizations were empowered (70% of the em-
loyees were hired on a temporal basis, 30% were public employees),
xploitation remained a matter of the state. With the PPP contract, the
utch government saw opportunities to break the monopolistic position
f Dutch Railways by publicly tendering the high-speed line concession.
utch Railways were very afraid that the line would be operated by
ne of their powerful competitors, such as Deutsche Bahn or the French
NCF. Therefore, Dutch Railways tried, unsuccessfully, to prevent the
ublic tendering of the HSL South concession. Therefore, they saw no
ption other than to make an offer the government could not refuse,
hich was twice as high as the bids of the competitors. Not surpris-
ngly, all the interviewees said they immediately knew that the offer
nd expected turnover were unrealistic. 
.4. Fragmentation of project organization 
The institutional environment is clearly visible in the structure of
he HSL South project organization. The HSL project, like the first case,
as split into three parts. This splitting into three separate parts was
ntended to speed up the realization of the HSL megaproject and to
ake possible the public tendering of the concession and the private
nancing of the rail infrastructure. The first part was the foundation of
he rail network, consisting of the construction of embankments, tun-
els, viaducts and bridges. This infrastructure work was divided into
ve PPP contracts for the foundation. Furthermore, there was a sepa-
ate contract for a seven-kilometer tunnel, and a contract to connect the
ew rail line to the existing network. Each contract was awarded to a
ifferent construction consortium after a tendering procedure. The sec-
nd part of the HSL project consisted of constructing rail infrastructure,
hich comprises rails, electrification and systems for communication
nd safety. This second part was designed, built, financed and main-
ained by a consortium comprising investors, international banks, and
rivate companies. Until 2031, the Dutch government will pay the con-
ortium a yearly fee to maintain the HSL and guarantee an availability302 ate of 99.46%. The third part of the HSL project was the transport fran-
hise. As described earlier, the exclusive right to deliver train services
as granted to the highest bidding party, which was Dutch Railways. 
. Legitimation acquisition approaches 
The institutional field elements influenced the two HSL project ar-
angements and their organizing. The institutional reforms, the industry
hanges created boundaries and shaped the processes in the studied HSL
rojects. However, our research findings indicate that the project man-
gement teams were not passive but developed responses for coping
ith these changes. We found patterns of normative, cultural-cognitive,
nd technical legitimation acquisition approaches in both cases, under-
ining the adaptation to the industry changes and the agency in projects.
e describe them in detail in the following sections. 
.1. Patterns of legitimation acquisition approaches in Case I 
Normative legitimation approaches: Being under government regula-
ion, Adif’s management established a phased review-based model, seek-
ng legitimacy for their project management actions. This model, follow-
ng a linear path, provided guidelines for their operations in respect of
he project. However, several events in the project context prevented
he Adif PM from always making a “rational decision ”. Due to high un-
ertainty, project managers sometimes ignored the process guidelines: 
“We were very task-oriented and not behavior-focused. We needed a
iant step to becoming better organized. There were process guidelines,
hich described how to run things, but the way we lived life, the project
ad little to do with them. ” (Interview with the construction manager,
ctober 2016) 
In this context, PMs at Adif and their contractors engaged in improvi-
ational actions, relating to “soft ” aspects and demands for the project,
ather than the “hard ” key performance indicators. At the other end,
he contractors similarly did not follow the guidelines thoroughly. Of-
en they did not render the details in the project plan, sending a vague
esign to the Adif project controller for confirmation. This helped to
afeguard them from contextual influences. Regarding this, the Adif CM
rew special attention to contractors’ behavior: “It seems to be a well-
nown behavior: contractors tend to be very crafty and disclose infor-
ation or reveal problems only when they really have to. It is better for
heir business ”. (Interview with construction manager at Adif, March
018). However, for Adif and the private organizations and other par-
ies involved, it was essential to have standardized project management
odels and comply with them. 
Cultural-cognitive legitimation approaches: Our interviewees de-
cribed situations where, even though the new rules and guidelines did
ot provide optimal conditions for rational choices, it was almost impos-
ible to confront them. Adif’s management was willing to adopt certain
ractices and expected others to do the same. In this context, the project
ctors felt safer following the preferred methods. The project members
ollowed them – because the legitimation of their actions was crucial for
he execution of the project. They had to relate to, and make sense for,
ifferent audience levels. The Adif PM described how the management
as affected: “It was challenging to deliver our part of the project. I had
o relate to and analyze the work repeatedly and intensively, not only
or the task at hand but also at macro levels. ” (Interview with Adif PM,
ctober 2016.) 
Therefore, the preferences of Adif’s management were not individu-
lly determined: instead, individuals fitted themselves to the activities
nd expectations of others while responding at different levels. Besides,
he Adif managers were aware that repetitive choices enhanced effi-
iency but made them less flexible. In this context, we observed a lack
f motivation on the part of Adif’s management to consider alternatives
egarding the project. Instead, the behavior that reinforced repetitive
hoices gained legitimacy, triggering greater acceptance by the project




























































































































p  embers. An interview with the head of infrastructure projects illus-
rates this: 
“We have a factor called social rentability that is valuable! ... For
nstance, if you give reasons for a specific part of the project not per-
orming and having problems due to communication, this argument is
onsidered prior to financial rentability. ” (Transcript of the notes col-
ected during a research-related meeting with Adif’s management, April
017) 
Technical legitimation approaches: Mimicking standards and formal-
zing operations through the use and form of complementary manage-
ent systems (e.g., the use of management standards and national con-
truction regulations in conformity with public law) explicitly guided
he procurement methods, thus restricting the agents’ choices. Simi-
arly, the ERTMS system and its corresponding products represented a
upporting tool, reinforcing some options over others. The management
ractices at the project level were influenced by the regulatory frame-
ork and the industry practices in the public sector – the public procure-
ent law shaped management processes and activities by, for example,
einforcing work divisions due to cost limitations. Thus, the project was
ivided into multiple packages, and the management had to manage in-
ividual work packages that, simultaneously, influenced each other. In
his context, the management at Adif and the private parties (contrac-
ors and suppliers) performed their work through repeated interactions
n several work packages. Such regulated public procurement and the
ndustry standards had a corresponding effect on the contractors, which
ocused on becoming more functional in proposing multiple solutions
hat would involve similar processes and activities. 
Importantly, the HSL Madrid-Barcelona project sustained and sailed
n regardless of the disturbances – legislative, governmental, and ad-
inistrative. 
.2. Patterns of legitimation acquisition approaches in Case II 
Normative legitimation approaches: The HSL South project was de-
ned as a result of a political discussion on future mobility in the Nether-
ands in relation to surrounding countries. The project design that fol-
owed was “new ” in the sense that the project group rejected a “sound
lueprint ” plan in advance (despite governmental pressure) but pre-
erred a participative model of project development. The DIWM project
dministration, which further developed the plan, comprised govern-
ental professionals with a broad budget mandate and a strong sense
f autonomy. They intended to develop an innovative tendering proce-
ure for the PPP contracts and a new philosophy of public-private col-
aboration, both of which were new to the Netherlands. This focus on
nnovation and autonomy resulted in a strong identification of employ-
es with the project. As has been observed in earlier studies (Willems
t al. 2020) such identification triggered a process of isolation, which
s the cutting off of connections with the mother organizations by the
roject organization; “they [DIWM] were not open and developed an
ttitude that put others off. They went their own way ” (Interview with
roRail manager, December 2003). In this way, railway infrastructure
wner ProRail was excluded from the HSL project organization; “There
asn’t a cooperative attitude ” (Interview with a manager from the Min-
stry of I&E, September 2003). 
Cultural-cognitive legitimation approaches: ProRail argued that it
ad 100 years of experience in rail construction and that it was formally
esponsible for the construction and maintenance of rail infrastructure
n the Netherlands. ProRail preferred to opt for a matrix model in which
t would have greater authority. It wanted to design infrastructure and
anage a part of the project itself: “Our proposition was to give certain
arts of the project to the different partners, and that these partners
ould be accountable to the project management ” (Interview with Pro-
ail manager, January 2004). DIWM and ProRail could not agree on
ow the activities should be organized, and ProRail was left with little
r no authority in the project organization: “We were lonely wolves in303 he wilderness. There was only one person with rail knowledge, and that
as me ” (Interview with former ProRail manager, November 2003). 
Technical legitimation approaches: Conflicts over project control
ad arisen earlier between ProRail and DIWM, which is why detailed
rotocols for responsibilities, roles, and cooperation were designed for
oint projects. In the HSL South project, DIWM signed a cooperation
greement with ProRail, as expertise on constructing such a complex
egaproject was needed: “Given the size of the project, the complexity
nd the challenges for the organization of construction work and inno-
ative technologies, it is necessary to use all the available knowledge ”
Internal document; cooperation agreement, 2000). This painful exclu-
ion of ProRail from the construction phase of the HSL South project was
isky for the Ministry of I&E as ProRail would, after completion, be re-
ponsible for the maintenance of the HSL. There was a risk that ProRail
ould blame DIWM for bad rail construction. Indeed, in October 2015,
he findings of a technical study, commissioned by ProRail, indicated
hat some of the concrete used in the project was of very poor quality.
espondents from ProRail criticized the DIWM’s approach to the HSL
outh: 
“We were not constructing a rail line, but dikes and tunnels. There
as a dominant focus on the environment with many adaptations, and
hat is why [the rail] seems to be a roller coaster. There is only one
ood rail line, and that is a straight line. ” (Interview with former ProRail
anager, November 2003) 
The HSL South project survived, yet it never came into full operation.
. Discussion 
This paper aims to understand how institutional field(s) influenced
he arrangements of two HSL projects and how managers legitimized the
rrangements. The findings from our collaborative case studies illustrate
he legitimating patterns that make the institutional project field level
art of the project’s life. Recognizing changes in the industry helps in
nderstanding the issues and making sense of the actors’ project pat-
erns of legitimation. The findings contribute two main insights into the
elationship between projects and their institutional fields. 
.1. Disturbance in the institutional project’s field 
The first insight is that the institutional project fields are in continual
ux. Our secondary qualitative data analysis shows that over time, even
atured fields re-form due to shifts in social systems, giving rise to new
onditions to which the project actors (organizations and individuals)
esponded ( Greenwood et al., 2011 ; Raynard, 2016 ). These findings con-
rast with previous literature on the project’s institutional environment
onsideration (e.g., Morris & Geraldi, 2011 ), which primarily portrays
he institutional field as sequentially ordered and relatively stable. 
Our empirical account shows that the institutional reform of both
ational railway sectors ( Duijnhoven, 2010 ) and the introduction of
PP contracting created turbulences at the project level, but with differ-
nt consequences. In the Spanish case, Adif emerged from the reforms
nd strengthened their position within the HSL project by procuring
he work, supervising it, and managing the lines’ construction project.
hereas, in the Dutch case, the reforms were deeply unsettling for Pro-
ail, potentially challenging its central role on the project delivery. As
arge and innovative contracts were inexpert to the organization, it gave
ise to a conflict with the main actor Rijkswaterstaat, which held Pro-
ail off from managing and controlling the project. Thus, the reforms
ade some project actors less powerful, altering the power differentials
ith other actors in the project setting. In both cases, we see that the
xercise of power was subtle and discreet during the period of distur-
ance; such as setting agendas and controlling negotiations. This indi-
ates that the industry reformation (this critical juncture) produced rel-
tively larger discursive spaces for renegotiation of the project actors’
ower and authority. In sum, we examined similar project organizations































































































































–  nd industry settings purposefully. Yet we detected that the changing in-
titutional field influence is not an invariant process affecting all actors
n the project setting equally. 
A crucial constitutional condition in the project setting, influencing
hether an organization pursues an appropriate response, is the organi-
ational position that enables them to affect the development and design
f the new project arrangements. The government, the regulatory sys-
em, and the industrial dynamics in particular are essential institutional
orces, particularly concerning the arrangement of large-scale projects
 Chi & Javernick-Will, 2011 ; Scott, 2012 ). We see from our cases that the
nstitutional influence increasingly stems from the international level,
or instance through the European industrial regulations and optimistic
olitical dream of integrating Europe into one political-economic com-
unity. So, the legitimacy required to convey these types of projects is
ontested and remains within the inter-institutional project actors, the
ndustry, the local and international government bodies. 
The influence of the institutional field’s changes manifested through
ormative structures of organizations and industrial regimes. The rules
nd norms, these institutional forces, altered the established meaning
ystem in the large-scale project setting, shifting influences of inter-
al and external forces in the HSL projects. Several actors and forces
ritically influenced the HSL projects’ governance structures and other
roject processes and activities. In the following we turn to the evolv-
ng collective legitimacy perceptions between the industry and project
ctor’s subset. 
.2. The project as a dynamic setting of institutional forces 
The second insight of our study is that the influence of the insti-
utional fields is not unidirectional; that project legitimacy, in conse-
uence, is neither given, nor does it purely emerge. That is, the man-
gement legitimacy acquisition approaches did not manifest merely as
 consequence of the institutional project field’s changes or because
f critical junctures but instead by a contested change along a con-
inuum, which culminated with the reformation’s implementation. We
dentified that the HSL project managers used three legitimation acqui-
ition approaches to cope with the institutional field changes, which
reated pressures to adapt throughout the project lifecycle. We thereby
eveloped a narrative and timeline of events illustrating the legitimacy
pproach variation during the HSL projects given changes within the
roject, and the institutional field level, see Fig. 1 . We exposed how
ctors engage in multiple legitimation activities in the confluence of in-
titutional field and industry pressures. This event time view, which we
ave undertaken, enabled us to thoroughly appreciate the legitimacy
pproaches as they proceed cyclically and capture the resulting slow
ndogenous shifts more realistically. 
We provide a temporal dynamic on cycles of project legitimacy
rocess and our interpretation of the empirical constitutive features
hen comparing both cases legitimating approach dominance through-
ut the project lifecycle. The project’s front-end promulgate the nor-
ative structures of organizations and industrial regimes as dominant
n project life participation. Hence, it is the normative legitimating ap-
roaches that reflected the positive evaluation of the HSL project orga-
izations. In such conditions, both cases had to be constructed, aligned
ith the time requirements. Thus, the project managers’ normative le-
itimating approaches dominated, see Fig. 1 . At this stage, HSL man-
gement was much more willing to initiate procedural rather than sub-
tantive solutions, despite their proposals being framed in communi-
ations emphasizing their contributions to project organizational effi-
iency. While thus far seemingly fluid, the HSL project’s legitimacy ap-
roaches were not without resistance. Instead, the project’s legitimating
rocess was inherently challenged by the emerging issues and their ac-
ive presence in institutional fields’ level. 
At the project implementation level, the technical elements were
ominant, so technical legitimacy prevailed. At this stage, according to
ur findings, the project gained prominence through the project man-304 gers’ performing approaches. Further insight concerns the HSL man-
gement’s considerations of the role of integrative arrangements – con-
inually recognizing the need to secure endorsement by field-level indus-
ry actors, see Fig. 1 . In both cases, the project managers turned to activ-
ties that enabled better communication with their “central stakehold-
rs. ” This conformance occurred both at the project front-end and the
roject implementation level. In the former case, however, the project
roponents gave meaning to the decision to build by advertising the im-
ge of modern transportation and connecting to the European rail net-
ork. Concern focused mainly on normative (external) legitimacy while
ddressing both project organizational and technical issues related to
he HSL projects in a rather superficial manner. Yet, we observed that the
ules do not always govern social action in projects, i.e., that although
resent – the changing norms and regulations did not directly affect
he project and line management behavior. Accordingly, in both cases,
he project organization’s normative structure became partly coupled
ith its behavior structure. In such a context, the project managers at
dif and their contractors, for example, engaged in improvisational ac-
ions relating to the “soft ” objectives and demands of the project rather
han the “hard ” cost performance indicators. Similarly, our interviewees
rom ProRail criticized the Rijkswaterstaat approach of the HSL South
roject. Hence, these findings affirm one of the main contributions of
he open systems perspective – the understanding that an organization’s
ormative structure is only loosely coupled with its behavior ( Scott &
avis, 2007 ). 
Besides, even in rare cases throughout the project lifecycle where
he HSL project organization’s enjoyed support and recognition as a rel-
tively legitimate actor; we observed no perfect alignment to the field
evel institutions – the industry. Adopting a less focal view, we observed
hat the management, in both cases, followed guidelines without ac-
nowledging their peculiar influences or developing them further. For
nstance, the PPP adoption was selected without actually demonstrat-
ng value-for-money over the traditional means (cf. Fara et al., 2018 ).
he interviewees generally interpreted the necessity for their projects to
e aligned with central stakeholders, such as the EU, the regional and
ocal governmental bodies. This indicates that the PM efforts were not
ramed strategically, at least not solely, as part of the existing literature
ighlights (e.g., Aaltonen, 2013 ; Derakhshan et al., 2019 ). 
In sum, the disturbance in the institutional project’s field, the in-
ustry changing conditions, contested the HSL projects’ development.
hey had a direct bearing on project legitimacy as an intervening dis-
ourse approach among the field’s changing conditions and the project’s
elevance. In light of the emerging industry principles, new industry
rocedures, and substantive agendas, diverse legitimacy approaches co-
ccurred and alternated (i.e., normative, technical, etc.), thus, creating
hat we label as cycles of project legitimacy process, see Fig. 1 . 
. Conclusions 
In this paper, we expand the theory of temporary organizing (Lundin
 Söderholm, 1995) by focusing attention to the thus far downplayed
nter-organizing facet ( Sydow & Braun, 2018 ; Hetemi et al., 2020 b). We
rovide an understanding of large-scale projects as temporary (inter-)
rganizations operating under conditions of temporal institutional com-
lexity ( Greenwood et al., 2011 ; Dille et al., 2018 ). We have studied this
y linking and recognizing the heterogeneity of institutional fields (cf.
reenwood et al., 2011 ; Raynard, 2016 ), and the legitimacy concept flu-
dity (cf. Suddaby et al., 2017 ). We explore how the institutional field,
n part, determines the project arrangements of two HSL projects and
ow project managers use legitimating practices to cope with the insti-
utional field shifts. The paper makes the following contributions to the
roject studies. 
.1. Theoretical contribution 
First, it contributes to a deeper understanding of institutional fields
the industry – across which large-scale projects extend. Although prior
































































































































i  iterature has focused on horizontal embeddedness ( van den Ende &
an Marrewijk, 2019 ; Hetemi et al., 2020 b), this paper provides a rela-
ional account of institutional complexity. It links the project to vertical
ierarchies – to the industry – to systems at broader and wider lev-
ls and to nonlocal horizontal embeddedness. The paper stresses that
he industry is in continual flux and highlights the effects of the in-
ustry changes on the two large-scale infrastructure projects studied.
esides, while Hetemi et al. (2020a) focus on the relational ties – the
etwork and influential mechanisms among the project actors – this pa-
er directs attention to the institutional fields’ structural context itself.
his study is thus one of the first empirical attempts in project man-
gement institutional research, and in wider project studies research,
o take account of the large-scale project industry dynamics. The value
f bringing the institutional-based view to large-scale project arrange-
ent and its organizing lies in its recognition of the interplay between
tructure and processes across levels ( Scott, 2013 ; Söderlund and
ydow, 2019 ). 
The paper affirms that large-scale project organizations experience
hanges in the industry, and the ensuing institutional influence, to vary-
ng degrees, which influences their responses. It substantiates that the
onstellation of the disturbed institutional fields and their influence on
arge-scale projects are just as essential to the project development as
heir economic and technical demands. In other words, any attempt to
nderstand large-scale project organizing should consider the industry
rocesses and dynamics accordingly. Taking the industry dynamics into
ccount sustains the interpretation of findings and generates recommen-
ations that are closer to the actuality of the project and, therefore, ap-
licable to practice (cf. Chiasson and Davidson, 2005 ). Studying this em-
irically entails a relational, institutional perspective that links projects
ith their industry and its dynamics. Therefore, scholars should avoid
ssumptions of industry uniformity and refrain from ignoring industry
hanges and their influences on large-scale projects. 
Second, extant literature on project studies has typically portrayed
egitimacy acquisition approaches as fixed and invariant – project schol-
rs have not considered how the institutional fields and the salience of
heir elements change over time, thus influencing the management’s be-
avior (e.g., Derakhshan et al., 2019 ; Nguyen et al., 2019 ). Dille et al.
nd Pemsel & Söderlund (see Dille et al., 2018 ; Pemsel and Söderlund,
020) are a notable exception in this context. Building on them, our
tudy accounts for how project actors navigate and cope with the insti-
utional field shift – the industry changes – in their attempts to legitimize
heir projects. Consequently, rather than examining the strategic legiti-
ation efforts of specific focal project organizations, we emphasize how
roject legitimation occurs as a structuration process ( Giddens, 1984 ).
n this paper we illustrate and reflect that the relationship between
he institutional field, the industry and the project organization is not
 one-way process, with emphasis on determinant institutional effects
 Söderlund & Sydow, 2019 ). Instead, it is a recursive process by which
he long-term institutions both shape and are in turn shaped by large-
cale (project) temporary organizations as hybrids. 
Hitherto empirical studies imply that project organizations enact sin-
le and sustainable responses (e.g., Nguyen et al., 2019 ). Thus, they ne-
lect the possibility of temporary adjustments to the institutional pres-
ures and disregard the potential for diverse responses ( Dille et al.,
018 ; Matinheikki et al., 2019 ; Pemsel and Söderlund, 2020). We iden-
ified three legitimation acquisition approaches that illustrate manage-
ent efforts to adapt to the new means imposed on them. To this end,
he institutional fields’ influence is not unidirectional, and the manage-
ent responses vary in terms of how subject they are to the institu-
ional elements’ salience. Providing an event time view, see Fig. 1 , we
ave depicted that depending on the salience of the institutional field
ressure, the industry element, project organizational responses varied
cross time and alternated. This we label the cycles of project legiti-
acy process. Our findings show that the richer and more diverse the
nstitutional project fields are, the higher the pressure the project man-305 gers experience and the greater the potential for confusion and conflict
mong the project actors. 
Yet, what does our collaborative case study report tell us compared to
he dominant perspective in large-scale project research (e.g., Flyvbjerg
t al., 2003; Flyvbjerg, 2014 ), which analyzes them from the normative
deal and classifies potential deviations from the rationally right deci-
ion as biases and errors? Based on our case studies, we argue that such
iews draw attention to the economic and more instrumental features of
he large-scale project but neglect the importance of institutional fields
lements. While the focus on the economic and technical features as a
ource of explanation is not wrong, it is incomplete. In practice, project
anagers look beyond rational choice and consider social approval, not
ust economic goals. In our framing, institutional fields impose institu-
ional pressures that are equal to, if not more important than, the techni-
al requirements in large-scale projects in the sense that they are multi-
aceted and enormously diverse and variable over time (cf. Scott 2012 ).
n this regard, our case studies tell us that large-scale project arrange-
ent and their temporary inter-organizing relies on management shift-
ng approaches of legitimation with time, between the institutional and
echnical requirements in projects, in their struggle to accomplish the
rojects. Thus, to neglect the institutional field, the industry influence
n large-scale project arrangements is to ignore considerable underlying
onditions shaping the project organizing. 
.2. Managerial implications 
Our research clearly indicates that project managers need to be
ware of trends and changes in the project’s institutional field, to the
ndustry elements where the project is embedded and extends over, in
rder to manage it successfully. They need to actively examine the cur-
ent institutional discourses on public-private collaboration, new pub-
ic management, and stakeholder engagement. A comprehensive under-
tanding of the institutional fields, the industry increases the project
anagers’ focus beyond the micro-managing of project activities and
elps them to adapt and interpret their agenda to valuable stakeholders.
iming in this is crucial as large-scale projects are self-induced shocks
o their surrounding environment. Project managers can then use their
rojects to experiment with new forms of governance and thus influence
heir institutional fields. Therefore, at the conception of a new project –
t the project front-end – client organizations, together with other indus-
ry actors, will have to define the organization’s (project learning) ambi-
ions collectively. At this stage, given the institutional fields’ complexity,
anagers should focus on creating an effective collaboration, through
hared workshops establishing a culture of open communication, and
eveloping close relationships with project stakeholders. A promising
ndeavor in this direction is relational contracting, promoting cooper-
tion and flexibility, which helps reduce inter-organizational conflicts
nd sustains normative legitimating discourses ( Qiu et al., 2019 ). Yet,
ollowing the PPP arrangement, and having the team managing project
elivery and approve project segments, was viewed as a conflict of inter-
st, which weakened the legitimacy of the HSL projects ( Report, 2017 ).
uch conflict can be avoided by assigning a smaller approval role or by
reating a separate agency to manage the delivery. Here again, limita-
ions apply, and multiple project ownership should be addressed ( Hall
 Scott, 2019 ; Matinheikki et al., 2019 ). 
When entering the project implementation stage, the significance of
ctor relations their timing norms and the project itself materializes.
roject actor’s normative legitimating discourses that ‘outmaneuvered’
he industry demands and the vast audiences at the project front-end are
lone insufficient. Under these circumstances, keeping stakeholders ‘on-
oard,’ and informed, needs much more effort and project management
kills. Hence, the project experiences an endogenous shift. That is, the
ogic of the project evaluation shifts, and so do the actor’s legitimacy ap-
roaches from partial decupling towards exploring efforts and perform-
ng approaches exhibiting technical content implementation. At this














































































































oint, technical and normative legitimacy approaches co-exist. Yet the
ormer dominates. Such a pattern is apparent in our cases. In sum, these
ynamic sequences of legitimating approaches, cause doubts about the
uitability of centralized management promoted by Flyvbjerg (2014) .
hus, it is necessary for the managers of inter-institutional projects of
he type analyzed here to acknowledge that the temporal institutional
omplexity their project faces is dynamic and co-created (cf. Pemsel and
öderlund, 2020). In such a context, managers need to mainly engage in
egitimation discourses by adopting a temporal response repertoire on
early trial-and-error schemes. 
.3. Limitations and recommendations for future research 
While we attempted to apply a relational view, through a neo-
nstitutional perspective, to the understanding of large-scale project ar-
angements, we acknowledge that our paper has some limitations con-
erning its purpose. First, while our collaborative case studies advance
 generalization of the theory, they do not establish evidence of a func-
ional approach for all large-scale projects. Thus, further research is
eeded to uncover additional variants of legitimating practices and how
hey may vary in industry contexts versus project organizational collab-
rations ( Oliver, 1991 ). Contradictions between institutional demands
t the macro level are experienced as conflicting role demands at the
roject level, particularly for the individuals – the project managers re-
ponsible. For space reasons we were unable to address such conflict
iddles. Another limitation of this paper includes the reinterpretation
f the data sets, which were created over the course of more than 15
ears. We tried to address this issue by going back and forth between
he original data sets and the analysis ( Rowley, 2002 ). In addition, to
elp us tackle this challenge, apart from concentrating on the focal or-
anization, in this case, both public organizations (Adif and ProRail),
e tried to include the view of other actors in the projects. To further
est and build theory in this domain, we encourage future research to
se ethnographic and process approaches, recognizing the multilayered
inter-)organizational settings, to study the influence of the institutional
elds in projects over time and in practice. We believe this will help fill
he current gap between theory and practice concerning projects and
nstitutions. 
upplementary materials 
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in
he online version, at doi:10.1016/j.ijproman.2020.11.004 . 
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